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Engaging in the art of creating and telling stories is a defining behaviour of humankind.
Humans have been sharing stories with each other, with and without words, since the
dawn of recorded history, but the cognitive foundations of the behaviour can be traced
deeper into our past. The emergence of stories can be strongly linked to Mental Time
Travel (the ability to recall the past and imagine the future) and plays a key role in our
ability to communicate past, present and future scenarios with other individuals, within
and beyond our lifetimes. Stories are products engraved within the concept of time,
constructed to elucidate the past experiences of the self, but designed with the future
in mind, thus imparting lessons of such experiences to the receiver. By being privy to
the experiences of others, humans can imagine themselves in a similar position to the
protagonist of the story, thus mentally learning from an experience they might have never
encountered other than in the mind’s eye. Evolutionary Psychology investigates how the
engagement in artistic endeavours by our ancestors in the Pleistocene granted them an
advantage when confronted with obstacles that challenged their survival or reproductive
fitness and questions whether art is an adaptation of the human mind or a spandrel of
other cognitive adaptations. However, little attention has been placed on the cognitive
abilities that might have been imperative for the development of art. Here, we examine
the relationship between art, storytelling, Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind (i.e.,
the ability to attribute mental states to others). We suggest that Mental Time Travel
played a key role in the development of storytelling because through stories, humans
can fundamentally transcend their present condition, by being able to imagine different
times, separate realities, and place themselves and others anywhere within the time
space continuum. We argue that the development of a Theory of Mind also sparked
storytelling practises in humans as a method of diffusing the past experiences of the
self to others whilst enabling the receiver to dissociate between the past experiences
of others and their own, and to understand them as lessons for a possible future. We
propose that when artistic products rely on storytelling in form and function, they ought
to be considered separate from other forms of art whose appreciation capitalise on our
aesthetic preferences.
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STORIES OF THE SELF AND THEIR
EVOLUTIONARY SPACE AND TIME
“How often do we tell our own life story? How often do we adjust,
embellish, make sly cuts? And the longer life goes on, the fewer are
those around to challenge our account, to remind us that our life
is not our life, merely the story we have told about our life. Told to
others, but—mainly—to ourselves.” (Barnes, 2011, p. 104).
Stories and storytelling are ubiquitous parts of our entire
existence as a species, and a fundamental feature of our bid to
develop our future selves. Every day we tell ourselves and others
stories that are detailed with our experiences, our hopes and
our future plans. We have a compulsion to solve the riddles
implied within the stories we tell ourselves. Story telling is a
primary driver in our need to understand our place within the
universe and where we may be travelling next. Autobiographical
stories describe us travelling the time- space continuum, placing
our past self as the protagonist of a story, mentally describing
the challenges encountered where and when, and how these
were negotiated to achieve a desired future outcome. However,
storytelling does not happen in a vacuum: by listening to the
stories that others tell us, we are able to gain insight into the
challenges that others had, and how these were, or failed to
be, surmounted thereby enriching our own mental stories with
possible ways of managing our own challenges. The ability to
tell stories, be that to others or to ourselves, appears epicentral
to both our mental and social lives, as it allows us to plan our
future with our past, and other’s past, in mind. However, little is
known regarding the pressures that selected for this intricate and
fundamental exercise, the mental capacities that allowed for it,
and how and why these evolved.
Here we will explore these questions by dissecting the art
of storytelling into the imperative cognitive abilities for its
production, and by scrutinising its adaptive value for both
the individual and the group. However, to do so, one must
consider, first and foremost, the space and evolutionary time
frame by which the behaviour and corresponding cognition
evolved. The birth of agriculture emerged but 10k years ago
(Cauvin, 2000), and the dawn of recorded history arguably only
occurred 5k years ago (Kramer, 1981), and whilst undeniably
the human ecosystem has massively changed thanks to these
hallmarks, these are, in an evolutionary timescale, minuscule
timeframes which seem unlikely to exert selective pressure on
the evolutionary development of cognition in a given species.
When considering how and why a human behaviour such as
the art of storytelling evolved, and its adaptive value, one must
not look for fitness in current times, as today’s experiences and
interactions with the world might be misleading. Evolutionary
Psychologists argue that the world is full of examples of processes
that evolved to guarantee our survival or reproductive success
in the environment of evolutionary adaptiveness [EEA (Bowlby,
1998)], but now, given the rapid environmental changes of the
human condition, can be thought of as maladaptive (Crespi,
2000; Miller and Polack, 2018). Therefore, given the misleading
nature of today’s environment, it would be flawed to think that
one can disentangle the adaptive nature of the mind’s features by
observing the interaction between current human behaviour and
current environmental challenges. If one wants to investigate the
evolution of art and the cognition thatmakes it possible, attention
should be paid to how evolving art and storytelling practises
would have been adaptive for our ancestors in the Pleistocene
era, during the 1.8 million years or more that hominids spent as
hunter gatherers.
THE EVOLUTION OF ART
From the intricate cave paintings that characterise the Upper
Palaeolithic, the sculptures of the Renaissance, the Elizabethan
theatre, to the largest selling blockbuster of the 21st century,
artistic practise has been an omnipresent characteristic of the
Homo sapiens (Dissanayake, 2015). The rise of Evolutionary
Psychology - a field that considers how Darwinian theories of
selection have shaped not only the physiognomy of the human
brain but also the construction of the human mind (Barkow
et al., 1992) - has provided a pathway to researchers who have
tried to theorise whether the qualities of art have granted the
artists an advantage in surviving or reproducing (e.g., Tooby
and Cosmides, 2001; Miller, 2011). Or whether art is but a
spandrel of other cognitive adaptations (Pinker, 2003b). While
the field investigating the evolution of artistic behaviours does
not lack theories of adaptive origin (for a review see Boyd,
2005), little attention has been placed on the cognitive abilities
that drive the behaviour. This is a significant query as, without
a proper investigation of its imperative cognition, one cannot
paint a full picture of the cognitive landscape in which the
behaviour evolved. If one is to propose a theory of origin for
art, understanding the mental abilities intrinsic in making it
possible, and when and why these developed in humans, should
be a priority. Dissecting the mental abilities imperative for the
employment of a behaviour can help us disentangle the specific
qualities of it, thus elucidating the possible proximal problems
that could have given rise to the behaviour. However, to fully
understand both the cognitive abilities intrinsic in a particular
behaviour, and the proximal problems the subject might be
solving, one must first strip down the behaviour into its most
simplistic form, as otherwise, the inspection would become
obfuscated by the surfeit of other factors that might occur as a
result of the behaviour, rather than as an originator of it. But how
do we strip down art to its most simple essence?
In this paper, our aim is to identify the adaptive need to
convey experiences to one another as one of the epicentral
differentiators among distinct forms of artistic practises. In order
to examine the adaptive need to describe concepts to one another
through artistic practise and its evolutionary timeline, we will
investigate the relationship between the art of storytelling (i.e.,
art that entails the transmission and narration of ideas and
concepts to the observer), with the cognitive abilities imperative
for its production–namely Mental Time Travel i.e., the ability
to remember the past and imagine the future (Suddendorf and
Corballis, 1997), and Theory of Mind i.e., the ability to attribute
mental states to others (Premack andWoodruff, 1978). We argue
that the development of both Mental Time Travel and Theory
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of Mind allowed our species to disseminate past experiences to
others for future use, with and without words, giving rise to
narrative practises such as the art of storytelling and ritual, and
that these practises became intrinsically linked to the survival of
both the individual and the group.
DEFINING THE ART OF STORYTELLING
Art is difficult to define because it encapsulates a group of
activities that culminate in distinct artistic products (artefacts).
Comparing a sculpture with a concerto, or a painting with a
Shakespearian play, seems like a futile exercise as such artistic
artefacts do not seem, a priori, to have much in common
aside from being categorised under the amalgam term of
artistic creation. Perhaps this is because art itself should not be
considered necessarily a product, but a behaviour (Dissanayake,
1992). It has been suggested that artistic behaviour has the ability
to act as an enhancer of vital activities a society partakes in
Dissanayake (1992, 2003, 2015). With the nomenclature “Making
special” or “Artifying,” Dissanayake argues that a society that
possesses the ability to grant some sort of importance to necessary
activities (e.g., hunting or foraging) will bemore driven to partake
in such behaviours and thus will have a higher survival rate
than a society that does not. For example, ritualising hunting
by making the hunting tool and hunting protocol special (e.g.,
decorating the tool and painting hunting scenes) places central
significance on the activity, enhancing it and encouraging the
society to partake in the behaviour more often or with more
precision (Dissanayake, 1992). While Dissanayake’s theorem
does not take into account the fact that behaviours which are
associated to the survival of an organism will, by default, already
be special to said organismwithout the necessity to be highlighted
by another behaviour (Boyd, 2005), the importance placed by
Dissanayake on the social feature of artistic practise is not
misplaced. Edgar Degas (1834–1917) a Parisian artist renowned
for his beautiful depictions of ballerinas and pastel artwork once
notably remarked:
“Art is not what you see, but what you make others see.”
In this quote, the talented artist observed how spectators of art
had a different perspective than the artist when observing an
artefact, and how authentic artistic skill relied on maximising
the transmission of ideas and emotions to the spectators of
art. Indeed, the surfeit of different types of artistic products
often enjoyed by many have a surplus of incongruences between
them, yet they also possess a very inherent commonality. All
artistic products, seem, in some way, produced to be observed,
understood, or admired by others. Moreover, artists engage in
the process of creation to narrate their thoughts, emotions, or
even complex ideology regarding the world they find themselves
living in, and perhaps it is the finesse with which these ideas are
conveyed to the observer of art that might epitomise the skill
of the artist. Think, for example of the difference between any
of the surfeit of songs encapsulating a tragic love story between
two parties, and an epic such as “La Traviata”: while the overall
story theme of both examples might not be very different, it is the
quality of the method of narration used in the later artefact what
characterises it as a masterpiece. This fundamental characteristic
of some forms of art, namely that they entrench stories within
their foundations, is why we will argue that some art practises
may be better considered as a form of sophisticated storytelling
between the artist and spectator. It is the narrative embedded
within artefacts that we think of as “the story,” and the ability to
partake in such levels of communication through art which we
call “the art of storytelling.”
APPRECIATING THE ART OF
STORYTELLING
Stories and some art forms appear to be intrinsically linked to
each other, making of the artistic products of these practises
vessels which artists utilise to reflect how they see the world.
However, some artistic products might not be inherently
designed to convey a narrative structure; painting and sculpture
are prime examples of this as they might not provide the observer
with sufficient information to infer a concrete story based on the
artefact alone. Indeed, observers’ appreciation of an artefact vary
both in reference to the artefact being observed, and the type
and quality of the observation being employed by the spectator.
Appreciating a painting of a landscape, for example, might be
based on an adaptation to recognise suitable environments in
which to settle, than on social or individual appraises of the
sublime (Ruso et al., 2003). Work by Orians and Heerwagen
(1992) and Falk and Balling (2010) suggests that affinity for
features that can be found in a savanna ecosystem seem to
be preferred across cultures. The savannah hypothesis (Orians,
1980, 1986) posits that this is likely to be a result of hominins
spending most of their evolutionary history as nomadic hunter-
gatherers in the Pleistocene savannah, which might have granted
us a sensitivity to landscapes that might provide us with the
right number of resources and protection from threats. While
modern day humans are, for the most part, not hunter gatherers
in the African savannah any longer, this sensitivity to welcoming
environments might still be moderating our aesthetic preferences
when observing paintings of landscapes. Komar and Melamid
(1993, 1997) interviewed a large sample of subjects from nine
countries about their predilections (subject and colour schemes,
among others) of paintings. Their results showed a strong
predilection for natural landscape representations that included
water features, an abundance of peaceful animal life and scattered
vegetation, while the observers mostly abhorred any kind of
abstract representation in the works of art. Similarly that our
aesthetic preferences of landscapes appear to be shaped by their
relationship with our survival, some of our other perceptions of
beauty and sublime might be a product of sexual selection. As
Darwin (1871) observed, animals appear to be able to appreciate
the plethora of colours and symmetrical features of their sexual
counterparts and choose their mate accordingly.
“This sense has been declared to be peculiar to man. I refer here
only to the pleasure given by certain colours, forms, and sounds,
and which may fairly be called a sense of the beautiful; with
cultivated men such sensations are, however, intimately associated
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with complex ideas and trains of thought. When we behold a male
bird elaborately displaying his graceful plumes or splendid colours
before the female, whilst other birds, not thus decorated, make no
such display, it is impossible to doubt that she admires the beauty
of her male partner. As women everywhere deck themselves with
these plumes, the beauty of such ornaments cannot be disputed.”
(Darwin, 1871, p. 94).
Thus, in a similar vein to the way in which female birds of
paradise Wahnes’s parotia (Parotia wahnesi) might find the
exaggerated dances of their male counterparts attractive, it
is possible that our standards for the movements [including
dancing, and performance (Miller, 1999, 2011)], colours
[including cosmetics and fashion (Grammer et al., 2003; Power,
2010)], and features that we find beautiful in other humans might
be based on our ability to discern the reproductive value of our
conspecifics (Bartalesi and Portera, 2015; Buss, 2015).
In contrast to artefacts which rely on aesthetic appreciation
alone, artefacts which use the art of storytelling (such as
theatre, mime, and dance, to name a few) are reliant on the
spectator’s ability to infer meaning from the artistic products,
which correspondingly is contingent on the artist’s skill at
communicating such meaning. Consequently, given the artefacts
inherently rely on narrative, the observer must engage in a
different cognitive process to understand, appreciate, and be
affected by it, in comparison to any other art formwhich does not
need to be understood to be appreciated. As we will demonstrate
below, in such cases in which the design of art is communicative
in nature (i.e., uses the art of storytelling), both Mental Time
Travel (Suddendorf and Corballis, 1997) and Theory of Mind
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978) are essential cognitive abilities
for its appreciation and affect. This might be because, as we
will elaborate on in this paper, narrative itself appears to be the
product of these cognitive abilities.
Mental Time Travel
In 1972, Tulving distinguished between two forms of declarative
memory: knowing (semantic memory) and remembering
(episodic memory) (Tulving, 1972). He argued that the former
involves the utilisation of timeless selfless facts about the world.
By contrast remembering involves the ability to project the
self and time, and to use such information to remember and
relive ones’ past and to imagine possible future scenarios,
which he further elaborated on in his seminal book, Elements
of Episodic Memory (Tulving, 1983). He identified two
vital phenomenological characteristics of Episodic Memory,
autonoesis and chronesthesia. Autonoesis describes a particular
self-consciousness that enables us to reflect about our memories
and therefore an awareness that we are both the authors and
owners of such recollections. Chronesthesia, entails an awareness
of the passage of time and our position within it. Taken together,
these two types of self- and time-consciousness enable us to
position ourselves, in our mind’s eye, forwards and backwards in
the space-time continuum, remembering past experiences and
anticipating possible future scenarios based on our memories
of what we think happened in the past and our current state of
mind. This Mental Time Travel ability to remember the past and
imagine the future has been considered to be epicentral to the
development of the human mind (Suddendorf and Corballis,
1997; Wheeler, 2000; Tulving, 2005). Indeed, thanks to this
ability one can remember what went well and what did not
from an experience and adapt one’s behaviour accordingly when
faced with similar encounters in the future, thus diminishing
the likelihood of repeating similar mistakes and increasing the
number of successes (Suddendorf and Busby, 2005). Mental time
travel allows us to imagine, in our mind’s eye, events that might
have never occurred (Clayton and Wilkins, 2018; Wilkins and
Clayton, 2019).
In humans, the ability is a core component of the appreciation
of any form of art that involve storytelling, as stories are either
based on the re-enactment of the episodic memories of the self
and others, or otherwise might describe scenarios of impossible
events where non-existent entities that ought to be imagined
are epicentral characters. Imagination grants us the ability to
transcend time and space and gains us access to the large array
of possibilities (and impossibilities) our universe has to offer.
The relationship between imagination and Mental Time Travel
has been extensively investigated (Taylor, 2013; Clayton and
Wilkins, 2017), and the ability to imagine has been suggested
to be an adaptation that evolved to facilitate the prediction of
the consequences of our actions (Suddendorf and Busby, 2005;
Tulving, 2005). Indeed, the Constructive Episodic Simulation
hypothesis (Schacter et al., 2007, 2008, 2012) argues that episodic
memory evolved with the future in mind: rather than preserving
an accurate record of what happened, the episodic memory
system uses information from past experience to simulate a
series of future scenarios, which allows us to juxtapose a
number of imagined alternatives to predict and plan for those
possible eventualities.
Theory of Mind
The ability to infer and attribute mental states to others has
been suggested to be imperative for the evolution of human
societies and its impact on our development as a species has
been compared to language acquisition and even bipedalism
(Baron-Cohen, 1999)1. Regarding its impact on art appreciation,
the relationship between art and emotion has portrayed artistic
creation and appreciation since the ancient times. Indeed
Aristotle noted, in his theory of catharsis, how observing tragedy
elicited intense emotions of fear and angst (Schaper, 1968). At a
neuronal level, observing artistic products seems to trigger neural
correlates of emotional processing (Chatterjee, 2004; Nadal et al.,
2008; Cupchik et al., 2009), however little is known regarding
our emotional responses to art and their underlying neuronal
processes (Skov et al., 2018). The fact that art triggers emotional
responses to its spectators is a characteristic element of art
appreciation and, perhaps, one of the factors as to why artistic
creations are so popular in human societies. Theory of Mind is a
conduit for empathy, the ability to be affected by the emotional
states of others (Völlm et al., 2006; Singer and Tusche, 2014), and
Baron-Cohen andWheelwright (2004) have argued that empathy
is moderated by Theory of Mind because in order to be affected
1See the section titled “evolving a Theory of Mind” for more on this.
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by someone else’s mental state, one must first be able to cast aside
their own mental state and attribute a different one to the other
person. Certainly, to empathise and be affected by the events
affecting a hypothetical character in a story, the observer needs to
identify the mental states and emotions of the characters depicted
in contrast to their own. Being affected by such types of art is a
keystone of the experience.
Music is an interesting example to explore as it is multifaceted
in its method of delivery; the melody of a song may perhaps be
appreciated by different systems than the ones used to appreciate
the narration imbedded with it. Humans are by no means the
only species that createmelodious tunes, however there is discord
regarding whether human music can be considered homologous
to the tunes of the rest of the animal kingdom (Herzog, 1941;
Marler, 2000; McDermott, 2008; Kuroyanagi et al., 2019; Mehr
et al., 2019). While several other animals are capable of melodic
displays, only humans appear to use music to narrate stories
to one another. As such, although the superlative appreciation
of human music’s melodies has been argued to be a product of
sexual selection (Miller, 2000; Ravignani, 2018), it is important
to highlight that humans also have the capability to, and often
do, appreciate musical pieces for the stories they tell. As such,
when spectators engage their imagination, emotion, and empathy
when understanding the narrative sequences portrayed within
the musical piece, they make use of both their Theory of Mind
and their Mental Time Travel ability.
In brief, it appears evident that some art forms fundamentally
differ from each other, not only in terms of the type of artefact, be
it visual or acoustic or both, but also the process of creation used
by the artist, and the cognitive mechanisms that the spectator
must use to fully appreciate the art piece. Some artefacts appear
to be moderated by human’s inherent aesthetic preferences,
whilst some other ought to be understood to be holistically
appreciated. The use of storytelling as a method of concept
diffusion inherent in some artforms may make for a valid
differentiator of artistic products, as it appears to rely on specific
cognitive processes, namely Mental Time Travel and Theory
of Mind, for its interpretation and appreciation. As such, we
suggest that when art forms rely on storytelling, they ought
to be considered separately from other forms of art which
only capitalise on aesthetic preference. This is an important
differentiation because, if distinct artistic products differ in both
their evolutionary history and the underlying mechanism for
its production or appreciation, they might also differ in their
adaptive value.
EVOLVING THE ART OF STORYTELLING
The homo lineage spent a considerable amount of time without
engaging in the creation of artistic products (Zilhão, 2007;
Powell et al., 2009): although Homo habilis already partook in
primitive tool making (Wynn, 1993), it wasn’t until the cultural
revolution in the Aurignacian era (40 ka) that our Homo sapiens
forefathers started engaging in painting, sculpture and decorative
tool making (Bar-Yosef, 2002; Teyssandier, 2008; Porr, 2010).
It should be noted however that just because Homo sapiens
started engaging in artistic practises that could fossilise in the
Upper Palaeolithic, that does not mean that before that era our
ancestors did not partake in any other artistic behaviours that
could not fossilise i.e., singing, dancing, dramatic performance
(Dutton, 2009; Garfinkel, 2010; Boyd, 2018). Moreover, whilst
it was previously thought that the cultural revolution in the
Upper Palaeolithic marked a cultural leap betweenHomo sapiens
and archaic species such as Neanderthals and Denisovans [with
whom Homo sapiens intermixed (Green et al., 2010; Reich
et al., 2010; Overmann and Coolidge, 2013)], more recently
contemporary archaeologists have started moving away from this
notion (Bar-Yosef, 2002, 2007). Indeed, the archaeological record
suggests that Neanderthals already partook in artistic behaviours
such as cave painting (Hoffmann et al., 2018), sophisticated
tool making (Douka and Spinapolice, 2012; Borel et al., 2017;
Hoffecker, 2018), and that they may have possessed a form of
linguistic communication (Dediu and Levinson, 2018; Botha,
2020), thus it is possible that these were not as cognitively
and culturally different to their Homo sapiens contemporaries
as previously thought (Hawcroft and Dennell, 2000; Finlayson,
2019). Some Evolutionary Psychologists have suggested that the
ability to share concepts and notions with one another would
have most probably developed before the Upper Palaeolithic
(Corballis and Suddendorf, 2007; Corballis, 2009, 2013a,b). The
climate shift towards cooler temperatures 2.5 million years ago in
the Pliocene epoch resulted in the environment of our ancestors
changing from a dense foliage scenery to a more open landscape
with less hideouts (Foley, 1987; deMenocal, 2004; Lahr, 2010).
This, in turn, probably left our ancestors more vulnerable to
predatory conflict while simultaneously forcing them to compete
with dangerous predators for protein resources. Such pressures
likely forced our ancestors to evolve adaptive mechanisms for
survival, in this case a cognitive niche (DeVore and Tooby,
1987) which allowed for sophisticated conspecific cooperation,
some level of effective communication and planning as a method
of collective survival (Corballis, 2013b). Homo erectus already
partook in a profusion of complex behaviours such as tool
making, cooperative hunting, and fire making (Wynn, 1993;
Antón, 2003; Chazan, 2017) this complex battery of behaviours
required mastery, thus teaching and learning, and somewhat
precise communication between individuals, which probably led
to more complex patterns of transmission (Dor, 2015, 2017).
Amongst his stages for the development of the modern mind
in the Homo sapiens, Donald (1993, 2013) posits that the
autonomic increase in motor control by Homo erectus granted
them a new tool of expression, through motor communication,
gesture, and body language, which revolutionise their ability for
social interaction and expression. Donald suggests that Homo
erectus evolved a mimetic mind which allowed them to re-
enact events to one another, such as the diffusion of new
stone tool manufacture techniques, social play, and pedagogic
interactions with children (Donald, 1993, 2013). Moreover,
intricate memory recall abilities would have been imperative for
the deployment and maintenance of such behaviours (e.g., to
sequentially remember the complex steps of tool crafting or to
tend a fire so it does not die halfway during the night). Corballis
proposes the emergence of Mental Time Travel abilities during
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the Pleistocene, as a result of group cohesion, future planning,
and conspecific conflict becoming prevalent factors in our
ancestor’s ecology (Suddendorf and Corballis, 2007; Corballis,
2013a), however more recent electrophysiological studies of
hippocampal recordings in rodents (Moser et al., 2015), and
behavioural studies in corvids and other animals give rise to the
possibility that it developed much earlier.
Perhaps it was because of the inherent importance of Mental
Time Travel ability in the development of the modern human
mind that many researchers, across a wide range of disciplines
from psychology to poetry (Burns, 1786) have assumed that these
abilities are uniquely humans (e.g., Suddendorf and Corballis,
1997; Corballis and Suddendorf, 2007). However, Clayton and
Dickinson (1998) challenged this claim by showing that a
species of corvid, the Californian scrub-jay can recall the what,
where and when of specific past events, and integrate these
memories flexibly (Clayton et al., 2001, 2003a) to plan for
future events (Clayton et al., 2003b, 2005; Correia et al., 2007;
Raby et al., 2007). Of course the issue is to whether, and to
what extent, the behavioural components of remembering past
events to anticipate future ones captures the phenomenological
experiences that accompany mental time travel in humans,
especially in the absence of agreed behavioural markers of the
phenomenological consciousness involved in the projection of
the self in time (Griffiths et al., 1999). Subsequent research has
shown that a number of other animals share at least some of
these abilities, especially the capacity to recall the what, where and
when of past events from non-human apes (Osvath and Osvath,
2008; Martin-Ordas et al., 2010) to rodents (Babb and Crystal,
2006), other corvids (Zinkivskay et al., 2009; Cheke and Clayton,
2012; Müller et al., 2017), and cephalopods (Jozet-Alves et al.,
2013; Billard et al., 2020; Schnell et al., 2021a,b). Perhaps this is
why some key protagonists arguing for the human uniqueness of
Mental Time Travel have now changed theirminds (see Corballis,
2013a,b; Boeckle et al., 2020). Corvid behaviours are considered
hallmarks of mental time travel in non-linguistic animals. Indeed,
their ability to produce rich and flexible representations of past
events and prepare for specific future events are comparable to
that of human children aged 4–5 years of age (see review by
Jelbert and Clayton, 2017).
The ability to remember past experiences and imagine
future ones grants the organism an advantage when interacting
in novel environments. The capacity to plan for possible
futures events presents the individual with more control when
living in complex ecosystems in which the events around
them might be unpredictable. In humans, the ability to
communicate imperative past occurrences to kin or even to
the general group, would be of general adaptive value for
the survival of the individuals within that group. Moreover,
the capability to plan for possible futures events, grants the
individual with more control when living in complex social
ecosystems in which the actions of their conspecifics are
out of their control. Altogether, the pressures encountered
by our ancestors, the reliance on social cooperation in early
humans alongside an uncanny ability to remember the past
and ponder possible futures might have sparked narrative
between one another, which probably laid the pavestones for
storytelling methods of art such as dramatic performance
and dance.
Storytelling is frequently thought to largely be a spoken
method of information transmission, in which sophisticated
language abilities can easily appear to be imperative for. Yet,
while the fact that language provides the transmission of a
story with accuracy and descriptive richness is undeniably true
(McBride, 2014), it does not necessarily imply that storytelling
was non-existent prior to the evolution of language (Laland
et al., 2016; Clayton and Wilkins, 2017; Boyd, 2018). Stories can
be choreographed, mimed, and re-enacted without engaging in
language, think for example of ballet and contemporary dance,
in which complex concepts are often transmitted only through
movement. Notwithstanding non-linguistic forms of art such as
mime, dance, and silent films amongst others, storytelling and
language are closely connected to each other, both in the fact
that language is extensively used for storytelling practises, and
their inherent reliance on both Mental Time Travel (Corballis,
2009) and Theory of Mind (Carlson and Moses, 2001; Astington
and Baird, 2005; Hughes and Ensor, 2005; Lillard et al., 2013)2.
Whether language acquisition preceded art creation or vice versa
is a topic of much debate. In the late 1960s, the American
geneticist John Pfeiffer suggested that language evolved around
40,000 years ago alongside pictorial art to aid the transmission
of knowledge between conspecifics (Issac, 1980). Indeed, the
engagement of Homo sapiens in such complex artistic practises
such as cave depictions required mastery and technical ability,
and it characterised another important leap in our aptitude for
social learning and transmission of skill as early artists refined
their talents (Laland et al., 2016). However, other theorists
suggest that language might be a universal feature of humans
which must have evolved in the African savannah at least 100
ka ago (Pinker, 1995). Certainly, if language only appeared in the
Aurignacian era, the fact that aboriginal Australians and Africans
possess language abilities even though they diverged from
European humans before the “Upper Palaeolithic revolution”
occurred does not muster (Miller, 2002; McEvoy et al., 2011;
Malaspinas et al., 2016). Corballis (2013a) poses an interesting
theory on the evolution of language, namely that grammatical
language evolved as a result of the human need to communicate
past and future episodes (Corballis, 2009). Language allows us
to be precise about the information that we want to transmit,
to place our stories within the construct of a particular time
dimension, and it appears to be specially well-designed to
express interpersonal information such as what happened, where,
when, why, and to whom (Pinker, 2003a). The ability to place
our experiences within a specific time and place poses a very
adaptive advantage as it allows us to communicate to others
our experiences so they can use it in the future, and likewise to
learn from other’s experiences without having undergone them
ourselves, thus guaranteeing we do not commit similar mistakes
at some point. As noted by Corballis (2013b) the adaptiveness
of being able to remember the past and anticipate the future is
exceptionally amplified when we are able to remember the past
that others underwent. As Santayana (1910) eloquently wrote:
2See Theory of Mind and Storytelling section for more on this.
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“Those who cannot remember history are condemned to repeat it.”
Indeed, Santayana’s dictum concisely articulates an essential
point regarding information attainment. This being that
information, while acquired in the present, is mostly used in
the future. However, while this is essential at an individual
level, at group level only information that it is transmitted will
be used. Different members of a group might have distinct
experiences, and such specific knowledge, if properly transmitted
will provide the group with essential information that would
guarantee survival. Unless the entire group has experienced the
history in question, communication is vital. Thus, one could
easily transform Santayana’s dictum into “A group that cannot
communicate history is condemned to repeat it.”
EVOLVING A THEORY OF MIND
Premack and Woodruff (1978) first coined the term “Theory
of Mind” to suggest that chimpanzees could have the ability to
infer their conspecifics mental states and adapt their behaviour
accordingly. Since then, the nomenclature has been broadly used
in many species of non-human animals and has been deemed
to be an intrinsic aspect of advanced human socio-cognitive
ability (Adolphs, 2001), enabling us to build shared goals, social
contracts, and to cohesively cooperate with each other (Baron-
Cohen, 1995, 1999; Ermer et al., 2006; Melis and Semmann,
2010). The idea that the complexity of living in social groups
has given a pathway to evolve heightened intellectual faculties
has permeated psychology for decades (Chance andMead, 1953).
The primate brain doubles in size when you compare it to
other similarly sizedmammals (Passingham, 1981; Dunbar, 1998;
Dunbar and Shultz, 2007), thus it is not implausible that such a
difference in brain size might be influenced by another distinctive
feature of the family, their heavily charged social environment
(Humphrey, 1976). Amongst the most prevalent theories that
could explain for the heightened cognitive abilities that apes
possess, is the Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis (Whiten and
Byrne, 1988b), in which, inspired by the works of the Italian
Renaissance diplomat Niccolò Machiavelli, one must be able to
understand the politics of the societal structure you live in, but
also be able to shorthand them if beneficial. Social pressures
such as the competition with conspecifics for resources and
sexual partners in primates shaped the need to evolve deceptive
techniques and mental state attribution (Whiten and Byrne,
1988a, 1997).
Machiavellian intelligence extends beyond the primate family.
The cognitive capabilities of corvids have been suggested to
be alike that of the Apes, and a great example of convergent
evolution of cognitive capability (Emery and Clayton, 2004).
Food-caching corvids live in socially complex ecosystems in
which their caches are liable to pilferage from conspecifics
(Clayton and Emery, 2007), as such these large brained birds
often alter their caching behaviour in reference to who is
watching them cache. These cache protection strategies are
complex in nature and have been compared to the intricate
techniques of misdirection used by magicians to mislead their
audience (Garcia-Pelegrin et al., 2020, 2021; Schnell et al., 2021c).
For example, jays will deprive the potential pilferers of visual
or acoustic information (Dally et al., 2006; Shaw and Clayton,
2013; Legg and Clayton, 2014), and will perform fake caches in
very quick motions, so the observer is unable to pinpoint the
location of the real cache (Emery and Clayton, 2001). Moreover,
some of these protection tactics are dependent on the experience
of the cacher, as they will only be used if they have had prior
pilfering experience (Emery and Clayton, 2001). Furthermore,
male Eurasian jays (Garrulus glandarius) are able to attribute the
desires states of their partner and actively adjust the type of food
they share in reference to their partner’s desire state, irrespective
of their own desire for a particular food (Ostojić et al., 2013).
Being able to disassociate one’s own mental states from that of
others might pose an advantage for social animals as it grants
the mind reader the ability to anticipate others’ behaviour. Living
in socially charged environments, in which the optimal social
strategy might be dependent on the intentions of others, might
create the necessity to evolve cognitive adaptations specialised in
mental state inference and attribution (Baron-Cohen, 1995).
The development of Theory of Mind abilities in our ancestors
is currently unknown, however, several hypotheses propose
different timeframes for when the ability could have originated.
On the basis that our closest relatives possess sophisticated
mental state inference and attribution abilities, Mithen (1996)
suggested that Theory of Mind was possessed by a common
ancestor who roamed the earth around 6 million years ago.
While non-human apes seem to possess sophisticated mental
abilities and can use tactical deception when competing with
conspecifics for resources and mates (Whiten and Byrne, 1997),
the suggestion that apes possess Theory of Mind akin to humans
is a topic of much debate (Kirkpatrick, 2007; Penn and Povinelli,
2007; Heyes, 2017). Field and experimental evidence suggests
that non-human apes might possess some degree of Theory of
Mind ability, but this does not necessarily mean that they are up
to par with the ones that our species possess. As suggested by
Baron-Cohen (1999) if current non-human apes had the same
Theory of Mind ability, they would also display behaviours that
are closely linked to it such as complex communication of shared
goals and plans. Thus, suggesting that Theory ofMindmost likely
evolved after our common ancestor, not before. Interestingly,
Baron-Cohen proposes the 33 ka mark as for when we can
be certain humans possessed the ability. This is based on the
construction of impossible entities such as figures of humans
with some animalistic body parts seen in Hohlenstein - Stadel in
the south of Germany (Figure 1), which suggests that humans
were able to indulge in fiction, a behaviour that involves the
artist being able to think about his own thoughts. Baron-Cohen
notes how it would be erroneous to conclude that just because
our ancestors participated in artistic behaviours such as cave
paintings, that they would have, in turn, sophisticated Theory of
Mind ability, proposing autistic artists as an example of artists
with impaired mental state inference capabilities (Baron-Cohen
and Wheelwright, 2004; Pring et al., 2012).
Indeed, through the examination of thematerial culture left by
our hominin ancestors a pattern of the evolution of their socio-
cognitive abilities (including the evolution of Theory of Mind)
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FIGURE 1 | Picture of the Löwenmensch (lion-man) from the Stadel cave in
the Hohlenstein, Lonetal made in the Upper Palaeolithic (between 35 and 40k
years ago). Picture by Dagmar Hollmann.
might be drawn out. Cole’s (2012) identity model, for example,
suggests that the occurrence of increasingly complex artefacts
and material culture in the archaeological record can shine a
light on the evolution of abstract concepts of identity in ancient
hominins. Cole suggests that the ability to communicate meaning
to conspecifics through material culture might inherently require
the ability to anticipate how the artefact in question will
be understood by others, thus implying that the artificer of
such material culture understood the difference between their
thought process and the one inhered by the observer or user
of the artefact in question (Cole, 2015, 2017). Specifically, the
appearance of mental templates such as symmetric hand axes in
the Lower Palaeolithic (Wynn, 2002) would suggest that early
signs of mindreading such as the ability to disassociate their
own thoughts, experiences, and ability from other conspecifics
might have already been present in hominins as ancient asHomo
erectus. Archaeological evidence of tool crafting and sharing of
symmetric tools between conspecifics templates (Wynn, 2002;
Carbonell et al., 2003) might also suggest an ability to alter
the personal beliefs of others regarding the self, and the later
within group standardisation of tool templates (Shipton, 2013)
might suggest a collective identity. Finally, the appearance of
artefacts which can be used to individualise a groupmember such
FIGURE 2 | Painting of a Balinese Masked Dancer. Author: Anak Agung Gde
Anom Sukawa.
as body ornamentation, which Cole compares to grammatical
language, proposes the ability to transmit abstract information
about the self.
THEORY OF MIND AND THE ART OF
STORYTELLING
Theory of Mind has often been described as an epicentral feature
for effective communication, because, to partake in fruitful
communication, all parties involved might need to infer the
mental state of one another, be that for transmitting information
or for receiving it (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). To communicate
a fact or change someone’s opinion, one must be able to deduce
how the other person’s knowledge base differs from their own,
and whether the information aimed to be communicated is
going to be effective for the desired purpose. Moreover, as
new experiences enrich and shape ones’ knowledge base, the
communicator must also infer how the past experiences of the
receiver might have altered the mental state of the receiver
since the last time communication took place. Indeed, mental
states are not stuck in time, as new information is acquired,
or new interactions take place, people often change their views
and dispositions towards subjects. Thus, being able to infer
such changes is essential for productive communication between
individuals. Without Theory ofMind, our communication would
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be unidirectional information that lacks the art of conversation,
the two-way discussion that relies not just on the accurate
transmission of information form signaller to receiver, but
the reciprocal information in which the receiver becomes the
signaller, and the signaller listens to the receiver. For this to
be effective both the receiver and the signaller must, in turn,
infer the mental state of the communicator to fully interpret the
language being used, as meaning and intention are often driven
by the mental state of the communicator and the response that
is triggered by such information transfer. Evidently storytelling
and communication are extremely linked, and diverse methods
of storytelling have been used for centuries as a method of
information diffusion. Consider Balinese dance (Figure 2), for
example, in which both philosophical and devotional epic stories
such as the Mahabharata and Ramayana tend to be recreated,
practises used as methods of cultural, ethical, and theological
diffusion for the population. Similarly, gothic churches have
depictions of passages from the bible in their, often colourful,
crystal windows, thus ensuring that the 12th century Europeans
who had no access to scripture or were unable to read it could still
understand the theological dogma.
Alongside communication, Theory of Mind ability is
also central to the well-functioning of a society as human
relationships are complex and often require access to the mental
states of others in order to anticipate their desires and intentions
(Baron-Cohen, 1995; Ermer et al., 2006). Storytelling traditions
have often been used in rituals for centuries to foster in group
cohesion and togetherness. However, while still prevalent in
many non-western societies, ritualistic storytelling practises
appear to have been forgotten by western societies (Dissanayake,
1992, 2003). This might be due to the 18th-century European
philosophy of “Art for art’s sake,” that gave birth tomodernist and
post-modernist art forms, in which the goal of the artist appears
to be driven by aesthetics rather than communication (Guerard,
1936; Knieter, 1983). Storytelling traditions are, at least in the
non-western artistic practises that remain thriving, a communal
effort, in which most members of the community engage in,
be that as a storyteller themselves or as a story spectator. The
communal aspect of these practises is an imperative feature of the
behaviour because creating and partaking in these stories might
have a cohesive functionality, by reinforcing the communal
beliefs and values through art and tradition, and by promoting
trust and cooperation between participants (Sosis and Alcorta,
2003; Sosis, 2004; Whitehouse and Lanman, 2014; Watson-
Jones and Legare, 2016). Indeed the development of collective
memories [created and delivered through cultural formations
such as ritual and monuments (Assmann and Czaplicka,
1995)] not only strengthen the cohesion of the community,
but also aid in forming its identity (Manier and Hirst, 2008).
Non-western communal storytelling art forms seem, for the
most part, to be linked to the diffusion of concepts such as
religious belief, philosophical and historical dissemination, and
the acknowledgement of important societal occasions such as
weddings, coming of age rituals, and funerals. While thematically
varying, most non-western ritualistic storytelling ceremonies
seem to be displays of their own belief structures, in which
they depict their rules and theories (Alcorta and Sosis, 2005).
Moreover, these are often performed in periods of disquietude
or change for the community and tend to be aimed at actively
influencing the group or the events that might be the cause of it
(Rappaport and Rappaport, 1999; Dissanayake, 2015).
STORIES AND SYMBOLISM
Most types of communication are inherently symbolic, think, for
instance, of the utilisation of words or gesturers (Kavanaugh and
Engel, 1998; Kavanaugh, 2011). Given the discussion of this paper
in which we exemplify the link between art and communication,
it is of no surprise that artistic behaviour might follow the
same symbolic patterns as other forms of communication. As
already mentioned, it appears that stories mainly entail either the
retelling of episodic memories (be that the direct memories of
the storytellers or the memories of others), or the enactment of
fantasy situations, which might vary in their degree of possibility
of occurrence but often aim at imparting specific nuggets of
information to their audience. The use of symbolism as a delivery
concept is an ever-present characteristic of storytelling, which
is prevalent in most story types regardless of whether the story
is aimed at children or adults. For example, in Dr Seuss’s book
“How theGrinch Stole Christmas,” (Seuss, 1957) the Grinch steals
all the Christmas presents, trees and decorations in Whoville,
to later realise that the material elements of Christmas do
not encapsulate the Christmas spirit. The message behind this
famous children’s book (i.e., that a sense of community and
belonging is imperative for the well-functioning of a society, and
more fulfilling for their inhabitants than amassing wealth or any
other materialistic products) is represented by the symbolism
behind The Whos, who represent the potential for people to
coexist happily, and juxtaposed by The Grinch, which represents
bitterness and antisocial behaviour.
Symbolism in storytelling andmemory are very closely related
to each other. This is because decoding the meaning behind a
story’s symbolism, often requires self-reflection rather than an in-
situ appreciation of the semantics that the story underlies. Indeed,
appreciating the symbolic representation of stories requires a
deep analysis of it, which can only be gained by analysing the
complete tale holistically. As such, it is impossible for a spectator
of a story, to be able to fully appreciate the symbolic concept
underlying the narrative that is currently being experienced, as
the spectator does not have access to the full picture of the story.
Therefore, the appreciation of symbolic concepts can only be
accessed through the afterthoughts of having been told a story,
by both recollecting the events that occurred within the tale, and
simultaneously disassociating our experience from the memory,
thus enabling ourselves to concentrate on the concepts that we
missed during such experience and not our experience itself.
Alongside the ability to carefully examine our episodic
memories, appreciating the symbolic representations that
storytellers use to communicate information is also dependent on
Theory of Mind ability (Keskin, 2009; Kavanaugh, 2011), as when
observing art, spectators ought to see beyond what is presented
to them, and appreciate the artefact for what it might represent,
not for what it is. Children under the age of 5 seldom distinguish
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fantasy and appearances from reality, and do not tend to operate
with any other viewpoint in mind than their own (Carlson and
Moses, 2001). Thus, as children learn about symbolism and its
uses for communication within society, they start seeing past
the aesthetical properties of an artefact and start understanding
them as communicators of information. The close relationship
between Theory of Mind and symbolism is exemplified in the
main assessments used to investigate the development of Theory
of Mind in children. For example, the false belief task (Wimmer
and Perner, 1983), in which the child being tested will be shown
information about a situation that others do not possess, and
will be asked to infer what others will expect to encounter when
interacting in the situation or object (e.g., that inside a cookie
jar there are carrots instead of cookies and will be asked to
speculate as to what someone else that has not been shown the
insides, will think the cookie jar contains). Children that pass
this task ought to be able to separate their knowledge of the
world, from the knowledge base a stranger to the situation might
have, in much the same way as the need to separate knowledge
of what I want now from what my future self will want when
the future finally arrives (Russell et al., 1999). As such, the child
ought to understand that internal mental states have a symbolic
relationship with the real world (Perner, 1991; Russell et al.,
2010). As children start to develop an understanding of the
difference between what it seems and what it actually is, they
start gaining an insight into the possibility of the world and the
people around them being operated by unseen forces and events
that the child has no direct access or influence in. While children
usually fully master the telling of their autobiographical stories by
the age of 6 (Peterson and McCabe, 1994; McBride, 2014), they
start engaging in rudimentary storytelling at the 2-year age mark
(Miller and Sperry, 1988) and participate in fantasy storytelling
notmuch later than that (Applebee, 1978). Curiously, similar age-
related milestones are found in the development of both Mental
Time Travel and Theory of Mind (Nelson, 1993; Fivush et al.,
2011; Fernández, 2013; Bauer, 2014), with both abilities having
the same cognitive developmental trajectory in young children
(Perner, 1988, 1991; Meltzoff, 1999; Russell et al., 2010; Clayton,
2015).
Stories are filled with symbolism, being able to use and infer
meaning form these symbolic representations appears central
to storytelling and story appreciation, and thus imperative for
the development and evolution of a storytelling practise. Mental
Time Travel and Theory of Mind are crucial abilities needed
to appreciate the symbolic intricacies inherent in the stories
we tell, and these two cognitive abilities seem to, in humans,
concomitantly develop with storytelling.
FINAL REMARKS
The stories we tell ourselves are intrinsic to our ability tomentally
navigate the space-time continuum by recalling our episodic
memories and gaining crucial information from them, whilst
imagining possible futures and how to manage them successfully.
We feel compelled to do so: we have no other way, it’s what we
have to do. Storytelling allows us to share our experiences and
offer them as lessons for others that might have had different
encounters, whilst simultaneously being able to learn from the
stories that others share with us.
Evolutionary Psychologists have theorised about the adaptive
benefits that engaging in artistic behaviours granted our
ancestors, suggesting art and engagement in fiction as an
adaptation of the human mind (e.g., Steen and Owens, 2001;
Tooby and Cosmides, 2001), a product of sexual selection (Miller,
2002, 2011), or a spandrel of other cognitive adaptations (Pinker,
2003b). However, current theories of art often amalgamate most
art forms under one umbrella. Given the inherent reliance on
Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind abilities necessary to
both produce and appreciate forms of art reliant on narrative,
in contrast to other more aesthetically oriented art forms; we
suggest that a clear differentiation ought to be made in reference
to whether the art form is used as conduit for storytelling or not.
Investigating the central cognitive abilities of a behaviour may
grant us a deeper understanding of both the cognitive ability and
the behaviour under analysis, as, by doing so, we can gain further
insight into the timeframe that the behaviour evolved in, as well
as speculating about the proximal problems our ancestors might
have encountered, and the way the behaviour under scrutiny
impacted such challenges. Mental Time Travel and Theory of
Mind are cognitive abilities imperative for the creation and
appreciation of performance artistic practises. This is because
performance capitalises on our ability to imagine distinct realities
and to understand and extract meaning from them. Furthermore,
both Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind abilities are
intimately linked with each other, both being vital for language,
and a similar developmental trajectory (Perner, 1988, 1991;
Meltzoff, 1999; Russell et al., 2010; Clayton, 2015). Certainly, the
parallels between art and language both in their use of symbolic
representation, inherence in Theory of Mind and Mental Time
Travel, and communicative purpose raise the possibility that
similar ecological pressures sparked both behaviours.
Storytelling is one of the central characteristics of some
forms of art. This is because through artistic practise humans
have been communicating concepts to one another at least
since the dawn of recorded history, with and without words.
Indeed, it is hard to provide adequate evidence as to the
purpose of artistic creation such as cave pictorials and figurines
in the Pleistocene era, and even harder to do the same with
other artistic forms such as dance and storytelling. However,
while the lack of fossil evidence makes it harder to assert
whether our ancestors partook in in similar practises beyond
that time, the stories that our ancestors told to each other
live in the cave paintings and figures that they left us,
in which some depict dancing men surrounded by musical
instruments and body ornaments (Garfinkel, 2010). Certainly,
given the inherent communicative nature that performance
art seems to possess, one can hypothesise that if our
ancestors engaged in storytelling practises such as dancing and
performance, they likely possessed the ability to infer meaning
from them.
While we undoubtedly use storytelling at a personal level,
by recreating our own autobiographical stories, jumping to and
from our past, present, and contemplating our future; through
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storytelling we are also able to share these contemplations with
otters, and learn from their own stories in return. Indeed,
storytelling and sophisticated communication are sides of the
same coin. This is because the art of storytelling not only engages
our aesthetic appreciation mechanisms, but also engages our
capacity to understand and create meaning, and our need to
question the realities that surround us.Mental Time Travel ability
seems vital for the evolution of artistic practises as, given the
discussion of this paper, most art forms diffuse information
of the past for future use. Similarly to Corballis’s (2009),
Corballis (2013a) propositions that the development of the
cognitive ability sparked language proficiencies in our ancestors,
it seems likely that it also triggered performance practises
given the inherent communicative nature of performance art.
Alongside Mental Time Travel, the close relationship between
communication and mental state inference makes the evolution
of storytelling in art unlikely without the development of a
Theory of Mind. Whether engaging in art that uses storytelling
is a behavioural adaptation evolved specifically to solve a
particular communicative niche or not is yet to be fully
theorised and evidenced. However, illustrating how engaging
in performance is typically a societal effort that requires the
use of sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities such as Theory
of Mind, the fact that engaging in performance behaviours
would conceivably have some social adaptive quality is hard
to deny.
Overall, the investigation of storytelling and its relationship
with both Mental Time Travel and Theory of Mind offers crucial
insight into our ability to mentally travel backwards and forwards
in the space-time continuum, to recognise others’ ability to do
the same, and to the advantages of doing so, individually and
collectively. The evolution of the art of storytelling tells the story
of an ape that was able to envision his or her past, imagine their
future, and live to tell the tale.
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